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I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

For many years courts have used the public
trust doctrine to provide some protection
for the general public interest in the
navigation, commerce and fishing associated
with navigable water resources. Cases
typically have concerned tidelands or
submerged lands and have involved
application of the public trust doctrine to
limit property rights in land. Recently,
however, several courts have concluded that
in appropriate circumstances water rights
also are subject to limitations in the name
of the public trust doctrine. The leading
case is Audubon, a California Supreme Court
decision dealing with the impact of
diversions by the City of Los Angeles on
Mono Lake. These cases give rise to the
question whether this application of the
public trust doctrine is in conflict with
traditional western water law.

B.

Reference Sources
1. Sources on the public trust doctrine in
general.
a.

H. Althaus, Public Trust Rights (1978).
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b.

Sax, "The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resources Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention," 68 Mich.
L.Rev. 471 (1970)

c.

Stevens, "The Public Trust: A
Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative
Becomes The People's Environmental
Right," 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 195
(1980).

2. Sources on the relevance of the public
trust doctrine to water rights law.
a.

Dunning, "The Public Trust Doctrine
and Western Water Law: Discord or
Harmony?" 30 Rocky Mt. Min. L.
Inst. 17-1 (1985).

b.

Johnson, "Public Trust Protection
for Stream Flows and Lake Levels,"
14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 233 (1980).

C.

Dunning, "The Significance of
California's Public Trust Easement
for California's Water Rights Law,"
14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 357 (1980).

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE
A. Roman law Origins
1. "By the law of nature these things are
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common to mankind -- the air, running
water, the sea and consequently the
shores of the sea." The Institutes of
Justinian 2.1.1. (Moyle trans. 5th el.
1912).

B.

Recognition in English Law
1. "All rivers and ports are public, so
that the right to fish therein is common
to all persons. The use of the river
banks, as the river itself, is also

ims gentium

public by the

[and one]

consequently is free to moor ships . . .
just as [one] is free to navigate the
river itself." 2 Bracton, On the Laws
and Customs of England 39-40 (S. Thorne,
trans. 1908).
C.

Professor Sax suggests, however, that the
core of the trust idea" is found neither
in Roman Law nor in the English experience.
J. Sax, "Liberating the Public Trust
Doc trine From Its Historical Shackles," 14
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 185, 186 (1980).
Rather, it is the tradition of the commons
in medieval Europe which is "the historical
experience that most clearly reveals the
proper sources for the legal public trust
doctrine today." Id. at 189. For
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these commons the medieval customary law
"[put] developed expectations, rather than
formalities such as title ownership, at the
center of attention." Id. at 192.

III. NINETEENTH CENTRUY RECEPTION OF THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE IN AMERICAN LAW
A.

The first clear formulation of the modern
American public trust doctrine came in 1821
from the Chief Justice of the New Jersey
Supreme Court:
"[B]y the law of nature, which is the
only true foundation of all social
rights . . . by the civil law, which
formerly governed almost all the
civilized world . . . by the common law
of England . . . the navigable rivers in
which the tide ebbs and flows, the
ports, the bays, the coasts of the sea,
including both the water and the land
under the water, for the purposes of
passing and repassing, navigation,
fishing, fowling, sustenance, and all
the other uses of the water and its
products (a few things excepted) are
common to all the citizens, and . . .
each has a right to use them according
to his necessities, subject only to the
laws which regulate that use; . . . the
property indeed, strictly speaking, is
vested in the sovereign, but it is
vested in him and not for his own use,
but for the use of the citizen, that is,
for his direct and immediate enjoyment."
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 76-77
(1821).

B.

The Arnold v. Mundy formulation is termed
"nonsense" as history by one commentator.
neveney, "Title, Jus Publicum, and the
Public Trust: An Historical Analysis," 1
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Sea Grant L.J. 13, 56 (1976). See also
macGrady, "The Navigability concept in the
Civil and Common Law: Historical
Development, Current Importance, and Some
Doctrines That Don't Hold Water," 3 Fla.
St. U. L. Rev. 511 (1975). It was,
however, followed in 1842 by Chief Justice
Taney of the United States Supreme Court.
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367
(1842).
C. Nineteenth century courts which accepted
the public trust doctrine divided on the
significance of the doctrine for alienation
of trust property.
1. Some suggested a direct and absolute
grant is void, as "a grievance which
never could be long borne by a free
people." Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1,
78 (1821).
2. Others allowed alienations with no
restrictions whatsoever. Hoboken v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 124 U.S. 656,
691 (1888).
3. Still others took a middle course and
decided through alienation the trust
could be destroyed for particular
parcels if such action advanced the
general objectives of the trust.

Eldridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80 (1854).
This general approach was approved in
the decision now generally regarded as
the leading U. S. Supreme Court public
trust doctrine case. Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892).
a.

In Illinois Central the state
legislature granted virtually the
entire Chicago waterfront to the
railroad company. Several years
later, the legislature purported to
repeal the grant. The U. S.
Supreme Court upheld the repeal.

b.

The Court assumed that the
submerged lands under the Great
Lakes are owned by the states as
"property of a special character,"
id. at 454, "held in trust for the
people of the state that they may
enjoy the navigation of the waters,
carry on commerce over them, and
have liberty of fishing therein
freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties."
Id. at 452.

c.

Alienation for improvements such as
wharves

which further

navigation or

other trust activity is permitted,
as are grants for improvements
which "do not substantially impair
the public interest in the lands
and waters remaining." Id.
d.

But "the abdication of the general
control of the state over lands
under the navigable waters of an
entire harbor or bay, or of a sea
or lake . . . is not consistent
with the exercise of that trust
which requires the government of
the state to preserve such waters
for the use of the public." Id. at
452-453.

IV.

TWENTIETH CENTURY CALIFORNIA DECISIONS
PROVIDING THE FOUNDATION FOR AUDUBON
A. During this century, the California courts
have generally followed the Illinois
Central approach on alienation of public
trust properties. The leading California
case is People v. California Fish Co., 186
Cal. 576, 138 P.79 (1913), which held that
a patent of tidelands passed "only the
title to the soil subject to the public
right of navigation." Id. at 588, 138 P.
at 84.
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B.

Uses beyond the traditional navigation,
commerce and fishing have repeatedly been
declared to be protected by the public
trust. There is no "outmoded
classification favoring one mode of
utilization [of trust resources] over
another." Colberq, Inc. v. State ex rel
Dep't of Public Works, 67 Ca1.2d 408, 422,
432 P.2d 3, 12, 62 Cal.Rptr. 401, 410
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968).
Tidelands are preserved "so that they may
serve as ecological units for scientific
study, and as environments which provide
food and habitat for birds and marine life,
and which favorably affect the scenery and
climate of the area." Marks v. Whitney, 6
Ca1.3d 251, 259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98
Cal.Rptr. 790, 796 (1971).

C.

The public trust doctrine has been applied
to the shores of inland lakes, where the
privately owned lands between the low-water
and high-water marks have been held to be
subject to a public trust easement. State
of California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 29
Ca1.3d 210, 172 Cal.Rptr. 696, 625 P.2d
239, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981);
State of California v. Superior Court
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(Fogerty), 29 Ca1.3d 240, 172 Cal.Rptr.
713, 625 P.2d 256, cert. denied, 454 U.S.
865 (1981).

D. The California Supreme Court also held as a
matter of state law that the public trust
doctrine applies to Mexican grants of
tidelands. City of Los Angeles v. Venice
Properties, 31 Ca1.3d 288, 644 P.2d 792,
182 Cal.Rptr. 599 (1982), rev'd sub nom.
Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State
Lands Comm'n, 104 S. Ct. 1751 (1984). This
decision was reversed by the U. S. Supreme
Court, however, on the theory that any
state law public trust right had not been
preserved in the patent confirmation
proceedings which took place pursuant to
federal law. Id. at 1753.

V.

THE SITUATION AT MONO LAKE
A. Mono Lake is an ancient and highly saline
lake east of Yosemite National Park. It
has no fish life. Brine shrimp are
plentiful, however, and they serve as a
source of food for large numbers of local
and migratory birds.
1. Several fresh water streams supply
nearly half of the lake's fresh water

inflow. The rest comes from small
creeks, groundwater and precipitation on
the lake's surface.
2. No streams leave the lake, and there
apparently is no loss by seepage.
Consequently water is lost from the lake
only by evaporation.

B. In the 1930's the City of Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power (DWP) made
plans to extend its Owens Valley water
supply system northward to the Mono Basin.
In 1940 the city obtained permits from the
state to allow it to divert water from most
of the streams which feed Mono Lake. By
the 1970's, when expanded facilities were
in place, DWP exported annually an average
of nearly 100,000 acre-feet of water from
the Mono Basin. This constitutes nearly
20% of the city's annual water supply. The
water flows to Los Angeles by gravity, and
en route it generates about 2% of the
city's electricity supply.
1. In 1940 when the state permitted the
city's appropriations the state agency
involved stated that:
"tilt is indeed unfortunate that the
city's proposed development will result
in decreasing the aesthetic advantages
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of Mono Basin but there is apparently
nothing that this office can do to
prevent it. [The use to which the city
intends to put the water is defined by
law as the highest use to which water
may be applied.] This office therefore
has no alternative but to dismiss all
protests based upon the possible
lowering of the water level in Mono Lake
and the effect that the diversion of
water may have upon the aesthetic and
recreational value of the Basin."
National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 419,
428, 658 P.2d 709, 714, 189 Cal.Rptr.
346, 351, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413
(1983) (hereinafter cited as Audubon).
2. In 1974 the state confirmed that Los
Angeles had perfected its Mono Basin
appropriative rights by issuing licenses
for the diversions.

C. Diversions by the city from Mono Basin
streams have caused a general decline in
the level of Mono Lake. This decline has
caused three environmental impacts of
particular concern to those who challenge
the diversions.
1. An island in the lake important for the
nesting of birds has at times been
turned into a peninsula. This has
allowed access by predators.
2. The decline in the volume of water in
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the lake has brought an increase in
salinity from 48,000 parts per million
in 1941 to 98,000 in 1981. This may
threaten the algae upon which the brine
shrimp feed, in turn threatening the
birds which feed on the brine shrimp.
3. Exposed areas of alkaline lake bottom
are contributing dust which makes
particulate levels in the area's
atmosphere among the worst in
California, frequently exceeding federal
emergency levels.

VI.

THE MONO LAKE LITIGATION
A. Major Procedural Steps
1. In 1979 the National Audubon Society and
others sued DWP in state court.
Plaintiffs sought injunctive and
declaratory relief regarding DWP's
diversions from the Mono Basin. One
cause of action was based on the public
trust doctrine.
2. DWP cross-complained against more than a
hundred others who claim water rights in
the Mono Basin, including the United
States.
3. The United States as cross-defendant
removed the action to the U. S. District
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Court for the Eastern District of
California.
4. The federal court determined that
unresolved questions of state law
regarding the application of the public
trust doctrine to water rights were
involved. It consequently abstained and
posed several questions to the state
courts.
5. In the ensuing state court litigation
the California Supreme Court held that
appropriative water rights and the
public trust doctrine are "parts of an
integrated system of water law," so that
Audubon could pursue its public trust
cause of action against DWP. Id. at
452, 658 P.2d at 732, 189 Cal.Rptr. at
369. The court also held that courts
and the State Water Resources Control
Board have concurrent jurisdiction to
determine water rights, although it
noted the advantages to be gained from
the use of administrative expertise.
Id. at 451, 658 P.2d at 731, 189
Cal.Rptr. at 368.
6. The federal district court remanded to
state court those portions of the case
dealing with the public trust doctrine.
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It retained a cause of action based upon
federal common law nuisance. These
decisions are currently in the process
of being certified for an interlocutory
appeal.

B. The Reasoning of the California Supreme
Court
1. The public trust doctrine is an incident
of state sovereignty.
2. The core of the doctrine is "the state's
authority as sovereign to exercise a
continuous supervision and control over
the navigable waters of the state and
the lands underlying those waters." Id.
at 425, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal.Rptr.
at 349.
3. This supervisory authority prevents
anyone from "claiming a vested right to
divert water once it becomes clear that
such diversions harm the interests
protected by the public trust." Id. at
426, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal.Rptr. at
349.
4. Where harm to public trust interests is
demonstrated, the state has a duty "to
protect the people's common heritage of
streams, lakes, marshlands and
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tidelands." Id. at 441, 658 P.2d at
724, 189 Cal.Rptr. at 361.

5. The public trust doctrine applies in
situations, such as that in the Mono
Basin, where harm to a navigable body of
water (Mono Lake) arises from diversions
of non-navigable streams tributary to
the lake.
6. State constitutional provisions that
limit all water rights to reasonable
beneficial use do not preclude use of
the public trust doctrine where water
rights are involved.
7. But because the prosperity and
habitability of much of California
depend on large-scale water diversions,
the state "must have the power to grant
non-vested usufructuary rights to
appropriate water even if diversions
harm public trust uses." Id. at 426,
658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal.Rptr. at 349.

Authorization of such appropriations,
however, carries the burden of properly
comprehensive and environmentally
sensitive decision-making. In the
future, courts and agencies which
approve water diversions in California
"should consider the effect of such
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diversions upon interests protected by
the public trust, and attempt, so far as
feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm
to those interests." Id. at 420, 658
P.2d at 712, 189 Cal.Rptr. at 349.

C. Presumably the court or agency which next
rules in the Mono Lake litigation will
attempt to give substantive content to
Audubon's feasibility standard.

VII. A POSSIBLE NEW APPLICATION FOR THE CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: INLAND WETLANDS
A. Many tidelands public trust doctrine cases
involve coastal wetlands affected by
navigable waters.

B. Recently the Natural Resources Defense
Council pleaded the public trust doctrine
in litigation over Kesterson National
Wildlife Refuge in the San Joaquin Valley.
1. The refuge includes Kesterson Reservoir,
which was created in recent years to
receive drainage water from the
Westlands Water District.
2. Recent discoveries indicate that toxic
levels of certain elements in the
agricultural waste water, particularly
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selenium, have caused deformities and
mortalities in birds at Kesterson
Reservoir.
a.

As a result, the Department of the
Interior announced it will close
the reservoir in order to avoid
liability under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act.

3. NRDC'S suit presents several significant
legal questions with regard to the
public trust doctrine, viz.;
a.

Definition of navigability with
regard to inland wetlands;

b.

Applicability of the public trust
doctrine to artificially created
waters such as Kesterson Reservoir;

c.

Applicability of the public trust
doctrine where public uses of
navigable waters are damaged by
pollution, rather than by fill (as
in the typical tidelands case) or
diversion (as in the Mono Lake
case); and

d.

Applicability of state public trust
law to federal facilities. In
particular, is the public trust
doctrine part of state law
"respecting the control and

17

abatement of water pollution" with
which federal facilities must
generally comply pursuant to
Section 313 of the Clean Water Act?

VIII. DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN STATES OTHER THAN CALIFORNIA

A. One decision from North Dakota predates
Audubon in subjecting water rights to
limitation in the name of the public trust
doctrine. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North
Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247
N.W. 2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
1. In United Plainsmen plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the state agency from issuing
permits to appropriate water for
coal-related activity until
comprehensive planning had been done,
particularly with regard to water
conservation and injury to the public.
They invoked statutory planning
provisions on water resources and
related land resources.
2. The North Dakota Supreme Court held the
statutory provisions to be only "a
significant advisory policy statement."
Id. at 460 (emphasis added). But it
held on the basis of the public trust
doctrine that water resources may be
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allocated "only after an analysis of
present supply and future need." Id. at
463. In effect, the court used the
public trust doctrine to make the
advisory statutory planning requirements
binding.
3. Although United Plainsmen contains some
broad statements on the expanding role
of the public trust doctrine in
environmental law, its holding deals
only with administration of the prior
appropriation system with regard to the
granting of new rights and with a policy
previously deemed desirable by the
legislature. It does not suggest that
diversions of water pursuant to
perfected appropriative rights might
have to be reduced in the name of the
public trust doctrine, and it thus seems
to be a less dramatic and important
decision than Audubon.

B. A recent decision from the Idaho Supreme
Court vigorously and explicitly embraced
the Audubon decision in dicta.
1. Kootenai Environmental Alliance Inc. v.
State Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 105 Idaho
622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983) involved a
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lease by the state of five acres of the
surface of Lake Coeur d'Alene.
2. The court stated that the public trust
doctrine applies in Idaho, and it
evaluated the lease in terms of that
doctrine. It concluded that the lease
for yacht club purposes "does not
violate the public trust in the resource
at this time." 671 P.2d at 1094.
3. Kootenai contains a detailed discussion
of Audubon and explicitly adopts "the
California rule." Id. It notes that
under this rule "the state is not
precluded from determining in the future
that this conveyance is no longer
compatible with the public trust imposed . . ."
Id.
4. Kootenai twice states that under the
California rule it adopts "the public
trust doctrine takes precedence even
over vested water rights." Id.

C. In other western states there are decisions
on public access to water for boating which
suggest possible judicial attitudes to use
of the public trust doctrine as a
limitation on water rights.
1. The Colorado Supreme Court denied public
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access to boat across a privately-owned
ranch and upheld a conviction for
criminal trespass in People V. Emmert,
198 Colo. 137, 597 P.2d 1025 (1979). It
explicitly rejected the use of the
public trust doctrine and/or a theory of
navigational servitude by the judiciary
to expand public access in such
situations.
The Attorney General of Colorado
has, however, expressed the opinion that
legislation enacted in 1977 and not
applicable to the events in Emmert
limits criminal liability in Colorado to
those boaters who touch the river banks
or beds. Letter of Attorney General
Woodard to Hamlet Barry III, Acting
Director, Department of Natural
Resources (August 31, 1983) (commenting
on purpose and effect of C.R.S. 1973,
18-4-504.5 (1978 repl. vol.8)).
2. By way of contrast, the Montana Supreme
Court recently joined the nationwide
trend to allow broad public access to
waters. It held that both under state
constitutional provisions and under the
public trust doctrine "any surface
waters that are capable of recreational
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use may be so used by the public without
regard to stream bed ownership or
navigability for non- recreational
purposes." Montana Coalition for Stream
Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163,
171 (1984). See also Montana Coalition
for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684
P.2d 1088 (1984).

IX.

CONCLUSION
The public trust doctrine has served beneficial
purposes with regard to tidelands and
lakeshores without seriously disrupting the
regime of private rights in those natural
resources, and it can do the same with regard
to water. Although decisions like Audubon
clearly do disrupt the expectations of holders
of appropriative water rights such as the City
of Los Angeles, they do so to respond to
important environmental needs. In this sense
they are similar to Winters Doctrine decisions
through which the courts have responded to
important social needs. Ultimately to be
inclusive of and sensitive to the environmental
aspects of water allocations is to produce a
stronger and more durable western water law.
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